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I
n this paper we test for strategic interaction
among U.S. states in the determination of tax
rates on capital income. We find that states
have a positively sloped reaction function to the
tax policies of rival states when tax rates are chosen
simultaneously. We also identify that a state’s size
has a positive effect on local tax rates.
A large literature in public economics is devoted
to the study of competition among governments.
The problem is interesting because competition
among public agents—governments—differs impor-
tantly from many aspects of what we know about
competition among private agents—consumers or
firms—both in terms of equilibrium allocations and
welfare outcomes. Underlying this problem are the
effects of competition on governments’ behavior
and its normative implications, in particular how it
affects the size of governments and the allocation
of public funds for the provision of public goods.
Examples of competition in tax policies among
governments include the following: competition
for mobile capital, or tax competition; competition
for mobile shoppers, or commodity tax competition;
and competition for mobile firms. These examples
are characterized by the mobility of the tax base in
response to tax differentials among jurisdictions.
In the presence of this phenomenon, a state govern-
ment’s choice of tax instruments is crucial for the
determination of stable sources of revenues.
Competition among governmental bodies can
also take many forms. For example, it can be hori-
zontal: among states within a federation, among
independent countries, or among regions within
an economic union. It can also be vertical: between
local and state governments or between state and
federal governments.
As motivation for the empirical analysis, we
focus on the literature on tax competition, reviewed
recently by Wilson (1999). In this framework,
governments determine tax rates on capital. The
equilibrium net rate of return on capital income
determines the configuration of the mobile resource,
the capital stock, among the jurisdictions. Revenues
from capital taxation are used to finance local
public goods. In the standard model there is a large
number of jurisdictions, which are unable to affect
the net rate of return on capital. Thus there is no
strategic interaction among governments. Mintz and
Tulkens (1986) and Wildasin (1988) first analyzed
competition among a small number of jurisdictions.1
Allowing for a small number of jurisdictions gives
individual governments the ability to affect the net
rate of return by exercising market power, and
strategic considerations are important—as in oligo-
polistic competition among firms.
In all these cases, the prevailing equilibrium in
tax rates results in an underprovision of public
goods because jurisdictions set tax rates that are
inefficiently low in an attempt to retain their tax
base. This occurs because, when one jurisdiction
raises its tax rate, it generates a positive fiscal exter-
nality on its rivals (by expanding their tax base
with businesses or individuals fleeing the high-tax
jurisdiction). Early studies examine the features of
the equilibrium among identical jurisdictions. When
asymmetries are introduced, usually in terms of
jurisdiction size (e.g., Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson,
1991), larger jurisdictions are found to set higher
taxes in equilibrium (e.g., Kanbur and Keen, 1993),
but smaller jurisdictions are found to enjoy higher
welfare. This effect is interpreted as reflecting the
market power of large jurisdictions because they
control a larger share of the aggregate tax base
(e.g., Hoyt, 1992).
In this paper we test for strategic competition
among state governments. That is, we examine
interaction among a relatively small number of
1 General conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and existence of the
equilibrium in these models were established only recently, for
example, by Laussel and LeBreton (1998) in the symmetric two-region
game and by Peralta and van Ypersele (2002) in the asymmetric case
with an arbitrary number of locations. The equilibrium of the model
with specific functional forms is, however, explicitly derived in
Bucovetsky (1991).
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affect the determination of the net rate of return
on capital income.
The empirical literature, in its approach to the
models of strategic interaction, estimates the reaction
function of tax policies—the rule that individual
states follow in choosing their tax rate, taking as
given the configuration of tax rates chosen by its
relevant competitors. The goal of such an approach
is, as in this paper, to account for the effects from the
interaction of neighboring governments, or relevant
rivals, in the determination of policies. We identify
neighboring states in terms of geographic and
economic distance.
Identifying strategic interaction, or the ability
of individual governments to affect the net rate of
return on capital income, has important implications
for the properties of the equilibrium configuration
of tax rates among rival states: In particular, changes
in the tax rate of one of the states, triggered by
exogenous factors in that state, will imply cascading
ramifications into other states’ tax rates if there is
strategic interaction.
This literature borrows from the spatial econo-
metrics literature (see Anselin, 1988, for an introduc-
tion). One of the first studies is that of Case, Rosen,
and Hines (1993), in which the authors test for spatial
interaction in the determination of state expendi-
tures. Besley and Case (1995) study strategic inter-
action in tax policies among states in a model where
voters evaluate the performance of incumbent
politicians using the taxing behavior of other jurisdic-
tions as a benchmark, or yardstick. Brueckner (1998)
analyzes the determination of growth control poli-
cies for cities in California. More recently, Saavedra
(2000) applies the standard model of tax competi-
tion to the case of welfare benefits, Brueckner and
Saavedra (2001) investigate property-tax competition
among local governments in the Boston metropolitan
area, and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) examine
the determination of environmental policies in the
United States (see also Levinson, 1999a,b).2
A study closely related to ours is Buettner
(2001), which analyzes the strategic determination
of tax rates on capital income using a panel of
municipalities in Germany. Buettner finds strong
evidence of strategic interaction. Other studies that
investigate strategic interaction among the continen-
tal United States include Case, Rosen, and Hines
(1993), Besley and Case (1995), and Fredriksson,
List, and Millimet (2002).
We estimate the reaction function for the deter-
mination of tax rates on capital income with yearly
panel data using the methodology of instrumental
variables, which is computationally simpler than
alternative methods.3
In the following section we present the econo-
metric model and the reaction function that is esti-
mated. We then examine the data and comment on
our estimation results. Finally, we provide some
concluding remarks and discuss avenues for future
research.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Tax-competition models predict the following:
When tax rates are chosen strategically, the reaction
function reflects the response of the representative
jurisdiction to the policies set by its neighbors,
because the mobility of the tax base—the capital
stock, for example—depends on the policies of all
the rival jurisdictions.
The model we estimate posits that a state’s tax
rate depends on the neighboring states’ tax rates
and on a set of local socioeconomic variables: 
(1) tit=ρΣj≠iωijtjt+x′ itβ+uit.
Since we use a cross-section of states over time, the
subscripts i and t represent states and time periods,
respectively; ρ is a scalar parameter measuring the
slope of the reaction function; ωij are spatial weights
used to compute the effect of the tax rates of the
relevant competitors of state i; ωij≠0 if states i and
j are rivals, and, by convention, ωii=0; finally, xitis
a vector of state i’s socioeconomic conditions, and
β is the corresponding vector of coefficients. We
assume that the parameters ρ and β are constant
across time periods and cross-section units. In vector
form, the model is given by
(2)  tt=ρWtt+Xtβ+ut,
where tt=(t1t,…,tNt)′is the (N×1) vector of state poli-
cies for the cross-section of N states at time t, W is
an (N×N) matrix of spatial weights, and Xt is an N×K
matrix with rows given by the set of vectors x′ it; ut
is the corresponding (N×1) error term vector. This
functional form can be derived, for example, from
the theoretical model of Peralta and van Ypersele
(2002) with asymmetric jurisdictions.
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web site, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/>.
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2 For a comprehensive review of recent empirical studies, see Brueckner
(2003).The spatial weights matrix, W, is constructed
from exogenous factors; it determines the set of
relevant competitors and captures the notion of
proximity among the states in the tax competition
game. When the spatial weights ωijare appropriately
normalized to add up to 1, the spatial lag term, Wtt,
represents the average tax rate of the rivals and the
spatial autoregressive parameter (or the slope of
the reaction function), ρ, measures the individual
response of a state’s own tax rate to changes in the
configuration of the tax rates among its neighbors.
Many alternative weighting schemes have been
used in the literature. Weights are usually assumed
to be known and constant over time; but, more
generally, they are chosen to reflect some notion
of geographic or socioeconomic distance between
jurisdictions. For example, the simplest measure of
proximity gives a weight ωij=1 if states i and j are
contiguous and 0 if they are not. In this case, the
weights are equal for each of the state’s competitors.
Another measure is based on gravity models where
the weights are inversely proportional to geographic
or economic distance, for example, ωij=1/dij
2, where
dijis the distance in miles between state i and state j.
An example of time-variant weights assigns a weight
of zero to noncontiguous states and weights each
contiguous state by its population. In our analysis we
examine a variety of alternative weighting schemes,
both with constant and time-variant measures.
The test for strategic interaction consists of
testing for the significance of the spatial autoregres-
sive parameter, ρ. Alternative models of interaction
among governments yield different predictions on
the sign of ρ. A common feature of models of hori-
zontal competition, such as tax competition for
capital, is the prediction of a positive slope. (See
Brueckner, 2003.) Analogous to oligopolistic models
of competition among firms, the interpretation of
a positive sign is that tax rates are strategic comple-
ments, as in the differentiated products case of price
competition. Models of vertical interaction among
different levels of government often yield a nega-
tively sloped reaction function. This indicates that
policies are strategic substitutes, as in the case of
quantity competition among firms. In our case, we
expect the estimated sign of ρ to be positive.
Tax rates are determined endogenously in
equilibrium; thus, the spatial lag term, Wtt, is corre-
lated with the error term ut, and ordinary least-
squares (OLS) yields inconsistent estimates of the
parameters. Removing the simultaneity in model (2),
the estimation can be carried out with alternative




where IN represents an identity matrix of size N, is
essentially the solution of the Nash equilibrium of
the game.
Equation (3) can be estimated by maximum
likelihood under normality assumptions. The study
of Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) was among the
first to use this method. Other studies that use
maximum likelihood methods are Besley and Case
(1995), Brueckner (1998, 2000, 2003), Saavedra
(2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), and Garrett
and Marsh (2002). Another alternative is the use of
instrumental variables, as suggested by Kelejian and
Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998,
1999). Empirical studies that use this technique are
Buettner (2001) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002).
These two methodologies yield consistent estimates
of the parameters.
Even in the absence of spatial autoregression
(ρ=0), the estimation of model (2) can lead us to
conclude erroneously that there is strategic inter-
action if the error term itself is subject to spatial
autocorrelation, for example, in the form of 
(4) ut=λWut+εt=(IN–λW)
–1εt,
where εt is distributed with mean zero and covari-
ance matrix σε
2IN. In this case, spatial dependence
in the error—for example, resulting from similar
geographical conditions—can induce correlation
in tax rates even though states may have no strate-
gic considerations. Uncorrected spatial correlation
in the error term would not affect the unbiasedness
of the estimated parameter β, but it would reduce
its efficiency. If there is strategic interaction (ρ≠0),
ignoring the spatial lag term, Wtt, in the estimation
is more serious, since it yields inconsistent estimates
of β. (See Case, Rosen, and Hines, 1993.) It is impor-
tant, therefore, to test for both kinds of spatial
dependence (in the dependent variable and in the
error term).
Maximum likelihood estimation is complicated
when we account for spatial correlation in the
error term by possible identification problems.
(See Anselin, 1988.) In our application we follow
the instrumental variables approach because it
avoids this issue, it is computationally easier to
implement, and it does not require distributional
assumptions on the error term ε.
Since we assumed that the parameters γ=(β′,ρ)′
and (σε
2,λ) are time-invariant, we estimate the model
pooling the panel observations, stacking observations
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where t=(t1′ ,…,tT′)′and ε=(ε1′ ,…,εT′)′are (NT×1)
vectors, with T equal to the total number of periods.
X is the (NT×K) matrix of stacked exogenous vari-
ables. W is an (NT×NT) block-diagonal matrix of
spatial weights, with T copies of W along the diago-
nal, in the case of time-invariant weights, and with
matrices (W1,…,WT) in the case of time-variant
weights. Finally, we assume that the covariance
matrix of ε is given by σε
2INT .
When the spatial weights matrix is the same for
both the spatial lag and the error autocorrelation
models, as we assume, an application of Kelejian
and Robinson’s (1993) method of moments (GMM)
estimator is outlined as follows. The covariance
matrix of the error term is given by 




The moments condition is the orthogonality between
the set of instruments H and the error term u: 
(8) E(H′u)=0.
Following Kelejian and Prucha’s (1999) sugges-
tion, we use as instruments the linearly independent
columns of (X,WX). The GMM estimator is given by 
(9) γˆGMM=(Z′D ˆZ)
–1Z′D ˆt,
where Z=(Wt,X), D ˆ=H(H′Σ ˆ
uH)
–1H′, and Σ ˆ
u is a
consistent estimate of Σu.4 Kelejian and Robinson
(1993) show that this estimator has an asymptotic
normal distribution. The asymptotic variance (used






We use yearly panel data on a set of variables
reflecting local geographic, demographic, and
economic conditions for the contiguous 48 United
States and the District of Columbia over the period
1977-99. We construct an average tax rate on capital
income using the methodology of Jones (2002) and
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).5
In the usual tax competition model, the tax base
in each jurisdiction is determined endogenously
by the tax rates set by the competing jurisdictions.
In addition, the tax base is determined by local
economic and demographic conditions, which
reflect the size of the tax base and the nature of the
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4 To obtain a consistent estimate of Σu, we use Kelejian and Prucha’s
(1999) nonlinear least-squares estimators of the error variance and
autocorrelation parameters (σε
2,λ).
5 This approach has been used for other purposes by Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2000) and Cavallo (2002), among others.
Summary Statistics: 1977-99
Variable
a Mean Mininum Maximum Standard deviation
Average capital tax rate (%) 25.8 16.4 42.2 4.4
Population 5,008,300.2 411,530.0 33,499,204.0 5,342,718.2
Population density 366.0 4.2 10,294.9 1,411.7
Percent of urban population 67.7 32.2 100.0 15.1
Percent unemployment 6.2 2.2 18.0 1.6
Per capita real personal income
b 20,669.7 12,309.0 36,870.3 3,103.5
Percent of working-age population 52.2 36.5 72.6 7.6
Average monthly temperature  60.5 50.7 68.6 2.1
NOTE:
aCells are averages over time of statistics computed over cross-sectional units.
bIn 1996 dollars.
Table 1public expenses the local jurisdiction has decided
to finance with tax revenues.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the
variables used in the estimation. Among the explana-
tory variables, we include real income per capita and
the unemployment rate to account for local econ-
omic conditions. We include population, the fraction
of urban population, and the fraction of working-age
population (18-64 years) to account for the charac-
teristics of the local tax base. In addition, we also
include states’ average monthly temperature to
account for differences in the natural attractiveness
of locations.
It is important to account for the size of states,
as measured by population or personal income, to
identify the effect of differentials in tax base size
found in the theoretical literature; as we discussed
in the introduction, the size of the tax base is com-
monly seen as indicative of the relative taxation
power of local jurisdictions.
For periods between national censuses, we used
population projections (including those by age group)
provided by the Bureau of the Census. Population
density was computed using these estimates and
the square mileage of states computed by the Bureau
of the Census in 1970, 1980, and 1990, assuming
the same values throughout the decade following
the census year.6 We followed the same strategy
with the measures of urban population. The data
on real per capita personal income are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the unem-
ployment rate is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The data on average monthly temperature is from
the National Climate Data Center.
We tried several alternatives for spatial weights.
First we identified the set of rival states with a
binary scheme for contiguous geographic bound-
aries (including states that share a common vertex).
Second, as in Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), we
considered neighboring states as defined by Crone
(1998/1999), who updated the BEA’s classification of
economic regions according to common movements
in indices of economic activity. The definition of
relevant competitors in this case captures similarities
in the composition of the states’ industrial base and
not merely their physical proximity. In addition to
these two binary measures, we weight neighbors by
three measures of economic distance: population,
distance decay between the states’ population cen-
troids, and the distance decay between a set of local
economic indicators. In the first case, weights are
given by ωijt=Pjt, where Pjt is neighbor j’s popula-
tion in year t and the set of neighbors of state i is
defined by one of the binary schemes described
above. In the second case, the weights are given by
ωijt=1/dijt
2, where dijtis the distance in miles
between the population centroids of states i and j.7
Finally, in the third case, we also compute weights
with the Mahalanobis (1930) distance between
states, using population density, average temperature,
and personal income as indicators.8 In all cases,
the weights matrix was row-normalized so that
Σj≠iωijt=1. This normalization facilitates the inter-
pretation and makes the parameter estimates of
alternative models comparable (see Anselin, 2002);
it has been used, even when the weights do not
follow a binary scheme, by Case, Rosen, and Hines
(1993) and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001).
Results
We present the results for the average capital
tax rate in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 we use border
contiguity to indicate neighboring states. In Table 3
we use Crone’s (1998/1999) definition of economic
regions to define neighboring states.
All variables are measured in logs, so the
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. The first
column presents the OLS estimation of the restricted
model, where we set ρ=0 and λ=0. This model is
used to compute the robust LM statistics of Anselin
et al. (1996) to evaluate the presence and source of
spatial autocorrelation, that is, in the dependent
variable or in the error term. LMρλ tests the null
hypothesis of no spatial dependence (ρ=λ=0).
When this statistic is significant, we also use the
tests for spatial lag in the dependent variable (ρ=0),
LMρ*, and the test for spatial autocorrelation in the
error term (λ=0), LMλ*. Both of theses tests are
robust to misspecification of the spatial dependence
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7 The distance was computed using the Haversine formula (see Sinnott,
1984) from the geographic coordinates for the population centroids
computed by the Bureau of the Census for the years 1960, 1970, 1980,
and 1990. We use the same coordinates throughout the decade follow-
ing the census year.
8 The square distance between indicators zit=[PopDenit,Tempit,Incit] and
zjt=[PopDenjt,Tempjt,Incjt] is computed as dijt
2=(zit–zjt)Σt
–1(zit–zjt)′,
where Σt is the covariance matrix computed using all the cross-section
units in period t.
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6 The square mileage of states differs only slightly among these census
years. The main source of variability in density is, of course, the vari-
ability in the population.in the error term.9 These tests have several advan-
tages over tests derived from maximum likelihood
estimation. The obvious one is that they require
estimation of only the restricted model.10
In the second and following columns we pre-
sent the estimation results for the full model using
the instrumental variables method of Kelejian and
Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1999).
With this model we compute Saavedra’s (2003) test
for the presence of a spatial lag in the dependent
variable, LMρ
GMM. This test also has good properties
and does not require distributional assumptions on
the error term.
The results for both definitions of proximity
indicate that there is strategic interaction among
neighboring states in the determination of capital
tax rates. Furthermore, this interaction suggests a
positively sloped reaction function in tax policies, as
expected. In terms of elasticities, a unitless measure,
52 MAY/JUNE 2003
Hernández-Murillo R EVIEW
9 In our case, we have assumed an autoregressive (AR) model for the
error term; an alternative is the moving average (MA) specification,
ut=λWεt+εt.
10 In addition, these tests have been shown to behave well even for small
samples using Monte Carlo simulations.
Regression Results: Average Capital Tax Rate, Border Contiguity
Dependent variable: average capital tax rate
Variables
a OLS W10 W11 W12 W13
Constant 1.36642 0.60228 –0.04111 1.31492 1.01958
***(2.88) (1.11) (0.08) **(2.33) *(1.95)
Population 0.06453 0.06824 0.06343 0.07440 0.06655
***(13.40) ***(14.51) ***(14.18) ***(15.02) ***(13.95)
Percent of  0.02217 0.04490 0.02131 –0.01191 0.00238
urban population (1.00) *(1.91) (0.94) (0.49) (0.10)
Unemployment rate –0.03044 –0.04167 –0.03163 –0.05814 –0.02532
**(2.05) ***(2.64) **(2.03) ***(3.42) (1.63)
Per capita real  0.12815 0.05523 0.08720 0.08263 0.04523
personal income ***(3.79) (1.31) **(2.15) *(1.87) (1.16)
Average monthly  –0.68053 –0.37025 –0.40014 –0.41866 –0.32413
temperature ***(21.37) ***(8.52) ***(10.01) ***(8.72) ***(7.10)
Percent of working-age  0.55510 0.10629 0.31355 0.08769 0.00012
population ***(4.15) (0.77) **(2.30) (0.59) (0.00)
ρ 0.61029 0.52769 0.44188 0.64329
***(9.12) ***(9.69) ***(5.87) ***(10.51)
λ 0.40673 0.32533 0.35571 0.23710
σε
2 0.01809 0.01386 0.01419 0.01532 0.01554
LMρλ ***386.11 ***287.54 ***280.68 ***257.84
LMρ* ***106.33 ***97.29 ***62.65 ***120.98
LMλ* *3.13 2.41 1.86 ***34.17
LMρ
GMM ***83.26 ***93.84 ***34.47 ***110.38
R
2 0.40224 0.55288 0.54206 0.47451 0.59520
No. of observations 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
NOTE: aDependent variable and regressors in logs. Weights matrices: W10=border contiguity, W11=border contiguity and population
weights, W12=border contiguity and geographic distance weights, and W13=border contiguity and Mahalanobis distance weights.
Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate significance at 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively, using the standard
normal distribution for the coefficients and the χ2 distribution for the LM statistics.
Table 2the response to an increase of 10 percent in the
average of its rivals’ tax rates (in this case, the geo-
metric average, since we are using logs) results in
an increase of about 4.4 to 6.4 percent in a state’s
initial tax rate when we use border contiguity.11 The
increase in a state’s own tax rate in response to a
10 percent increase in the average tax rate of its
neighbors is smaller, about 0.5 to 0.6 percent, if we
consider economic regions. The spatial lag coeffi-
cients are significant according to standard z-statistics,
but also according to the LM statistics.12 The robust
LM statistics computed with the OLS residuals sug-
gest that the spatial dependent variable lag is the
relevant source of spatial dependence when we use
border contiguity in the spatial weights; but the tests
identify spatial effects also in the error term when
we use economic regions to assess proximity.
Turning to the explanatory variables, we find a
positive effect of local population, indicating that
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Regression Results: Average Capital Tax Rate, Crone’s Regions
Dependent variable: average capital tax rate
Variables
a OLS W20 W21 W22 W23
Constant 1.36642 –1.85057 –2.55462 –0.73050 –1.50925
***(2.88) ***(3.75) ***(5.12) (1.35) ***(2.74)
Population 0.06453 0.04480 0.04981 0.04014 0.04529
***(13.40) ***(9.79) ***(10.52) ***(8.55) ***(9.54)
Percent of  0.02217 –0.00154 –0.03127 0.00227 –0.01588
urban population (1.00) (0.07) (1.37) (0.10) (0.68)
Unemployment rate –0.03044 0.01587 0.01896 0.02212 –0.00061
**(2.05) (0.99) (1.18) (1.32) (0.04)
Per capita real  0.12815 0.33132 0.32649 0.27656 0.26924
personal income ***(3.79) ***(7.78) ***(7.81) ***(6.49) ***(6.39)
Average monthly  –0.68053 –0.54038 –0.48311 –0.52082 –0.57077
temperature ***(21.37) ***(16.62) ***(14.80) ***(14.59) ***(15.10)
Percent of working-age  0.55510 0.74568 0.88353 0.59960 0.86781
population ***(4.15) ***(5.85) ***(6.70) ***(4.39) ***(6.46)
ρ 0.05686 0.05727 0.05272 0.04919
***(5.84) ***(5.97) ***(5.42) ***(4.94)
λ 0.51804 0.43683 0.43159 0.41357
σε
2 0.01809 0.01369 0.01388 0.01410 0.01462
LMρλ ***400.87 ***256.67 ***269.27 ***236.12
LMρ* **4.69 **6.59 ***9.52 **4.47
LMλ* ***366.64 ***220.77 ***218.77 ***200.41
LMρ
GMM ***34.1 ***35.59 ***29.35 ***24.44
R
2 0.40224 0.46687 0.44396 0.38293 0.44700
No. of observations  1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
NOTE: aDependent variable and regressors in logs. Weights matrices: W20=Crone’s regions, W21=Crone’s regions and population
weights, W22=Crone’s regions and geographic distance weights, and W23=Crone’s regions and Mahalanobis distance weights.
Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate significance at 10/5/1 percent levels, respectively, using the standard
normal distribution for the coefficients and the χ2 distribution for the LM statistics.
Table 3
11 That is, if the state’s initial tax rate was 25 percent, according to its
reaction function this state will increase its tax rate to 26.1 percent, a
percentage change of 4.4 percentage points.
12 Since the estimators are asymptotically normally distributed, we use the
standard normal probabilities to evaluate significance of the coefficients.more-populated states set higher tax rates. The
elasticity is significant and is about 0.06 in the case
of border contiguity and about 0.04 in the case of
economic regions. Real per capita income also has
a positive effect, but it is significant only when
economic regions are considered; the elasticity is
about seven times as large as the elasticity of popu-
lation in this case. The signs of these effects are
consistent with the view that larger (or richer) juris-
dictions have higher market power at taxing local
businesses, as is found in the theoretical models of
Bucovetsky (1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993), and
more recently Peralta and van Ypersele (2002).
The rate of unemployment has a statistically
significant effect only in the case of border conti-
guity, and the effect is negative. The fraction of
working-age population has a positive effect on
local tax rates. These results are consistent with the
positive effect of real per capita income and the
size-effect interpretation.13
The degree of urbanization was not found to
be significant in any of the specifications. We also
included monthly average temperature as an
explanatory variable to account for differences in
the natural attractiveness of locations. The coeffi-
cient was found to be negatively significant; this
may indicate differential effects of natural local
advantages (as in north versus south) in the deter-
mination of tax policies.
In assessing the economic significance of these
parameter estimates, it is important to notice that,
because we have identified that there is strategic
interaction, the effects of the exogenous variables
will have an impact on the entire configuration of
equilibrium tax rates; this is true even if they take
place in only one of the competitor states, through
their repercussions on the local tax rates and, sub-
sequently, through the responses in the tax-setting
behavior of the other states.
CONCLUSION
The identification of strategic interaction in
models of tax competition has important implica-
tions for the analysis of the comparative statics of
the equilibrium configuration of tax rates. In this
paper we found evidence of strategic interaction
among states in the determination of tax policies
on capital income. When we examined competition
among states that share common movements in
economic activity, the elasticity of the average tax
rate of neighboring states was found to be as large
as the elasticity of local economic variables such
as real per capita income. The elasticity of local
population was much larger.
In our investigation we did not model explicitly
the source of strategic interaction between state
governments. This is a limitation of the analysis in
the sense that the source of interaction is not identi-
fied. We used as motivation for the analysis the
traditional model of capital tax competition, but
the empirical results may be consistent with other
types of competition, such as yardstick competition
among politicians in models of elections.
Our results are encouraging, however, because
once the presence of strategic interaction is identi-
fied, the natural extension is to try to account for
specific models of tax competition to analyze the
normative implications of government behavior
we discussed in the introduction. One possibility is
to test for specific forms of the objective function of
competing governments. For example, given existing
arguments in the popular press and legislative efforts
to curtail horizontal competition among governments
in the United States, one could assess the welfare
costs of competition by testing the implications of
assuming that states behave as welfare maximizers
or as revenue maximizers.
Finally, by making the computer code available
to the reader, we expect this paper to serve also as
an illustration of the method of instrumental vari-
ables. This technique is computationally simpler
than maximum likelihood and allows for faster esti-
mation of the full model even when spatial effects
in the error term have the same spatial weights
matrix as the spatial lag in the dependent variable.
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CALCULATION OF AVERAGE CAPITAL
TAX RATES
Appendix B in Jones (2002) describes his
approach to calculating national average tax rates
on capital income using the national income and
product accounts (NIPA). We follow the same
methodology and calculate average tax rates on
capital income at the state level using the state
analog of the variables he describes.
The average tax rate on capital income is
defined, using Jones’s (2002) notation, as 
,
where CI is capital income, PT is (corporate) prop-
erty state and local tax payments, and CT is state
corporate (income) tax payments. Capital income










where PRI is proprietor’s income, RI is rents
income, CP is dividends, and NI is net interest
income. Finally, the personal income tax rate, τP,
is defined by 
,
where FTI is (personal) federal income tax pay-
ments, SIT is (personal) state income tax pay-
ments, and W is wages and salary income.
In our calculations, the corporate income and
property tax payments were obtained from state
and local government finances data from the
Bureau of the Census. The variables used to com-
pute capital income and the average personal
income tax rate were obtained from the state per-
sonal income calculations of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
τP
FIT SIT
W PRI CI
=
+
++ /2